curious notes

Three conceptions of non-wuwei nature in Laozi

Laozi seems to suggest that, in the Way, what happens is natural, spontaneous or "so of itself" (translating e.g. 自然 ziran; see Ivanhoe's introductory essay, 172).1 For example, "Should barons and kings be able to preserve it [the Way], the myriad creatures will transform themselves [自化 zihua]" (ch. 37, 190). Similarly,

And so, sages say,
"I do nothing and the people transform themselves...." (ch. 57, 199)

However, if the Way is the expression of the nature things have of themselves, much of the advice of Laozi might seem to be against that nature and thus against the Way. For example, Laozi counsels that people should not strive (e.g. ch. 37, 48, 64) or desire too much (e.g. ch. 44), but we might think that to strive and desire too much is part of the nature that people have of themselves. These deviations from wuwei thus seem to be part of the Way, contrary to the general tenor of the text. At least three interpretations of this apparent contradiction are available.

First, we could take it that the contradiction is a paradox, in line with the overall paradoxical argumentative strategy of the text. However, the purported paradox of counseling both natural and unnatural ways of being does not seem to line up with other paradoxes present in the text. It is not clear how such a paradox would fit with the general rhetorical aims of the text.

Second, we could take it that, while nature is an ideal, it is a lower ideal than the great Way, the name that cannot be named (cf. ch. 1, 173).2 Laozi does present hierarchies of ideal, with some being better than others. For example, in ch. 18, he discusses virtues and goods that are still present "[w]hen the great Way is abandoned" (181; see also ch. 38, 190). In chapter 37, Laozi suggests that after "the myriad creatures ... transform themselves [zihua]," they might still fall short of the way and "still desire to act," in which case "I shall press them down with the weight of nameless unhewn wood ["or nameless simplicity," footnote 74]" (189-90).

Without desire and still, the world will settle itself. (190; 天下將自定, "settle itself" = 自定 ziding)

At first this chapter presents the idea that the creatures' natural transformation of themselves (zihua) may be inadequate to achieving the state of restfulness that is freedom from desire; they should then be pressed down. In this pressed down state, the world will settle itself (ziding) -- a natural or spontaneous happening is again invoked, but the world has reached the state where this is its natural action only by being pressed down. Notably, in this chapter, nature or self-activity seems to play a subordinate role to the great Way. The world will settle itself when certain other conditions, not themselves said to be natural, are met.

Alternatively, we might settle the apparent contradiction by denying that people strive and desire too much by nature. We might instead take it that they do so because they have fallen from an older, natural way of life. Some support for this idea of fallenness can be found in the text. For example, in chapter 65, Laozi offers "ancient times" as a model for wise rule. In these better times, the people were not "enlightened" but kept "in the dark" (203). In chapter 80, similarly, literacy and population growth are both suggested to be impediments to a good civil life (209-10). Striving and too much desire, we might take it, come from progress rather than from nature. Thus, there is no contradiction between nature and the Way, at least if the way calls for moderate desires more in line with ancient life. However, if the Way involves not just moderation but cessation of desire (see e.g. ch. 34, 37), then this may go beyond what nature by itself achieves, suggesting (in line with the previous interpretation) that nature is a lesser good than the great Way.

  1. Page citations are to Ivanhoe and Van Norden (2023), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (3rd ed.). Translations are Ivanhoe (except where otherwise noted).

  2. Note to self this is roughly the position that was championed by my friends in the Chinese Philosophy Reading Group last month.